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A. Seizure of Persons
1. In General
In determining the reasonableness of the seizure of a person, courts
must consider whether there is a sufficient justification to intrude upon
one's "right to be let alone''' and whether the seizure was executed in
a reasonable manner. 2 For a custodial arrest, probable cause is required 3-
for lesser seizures, articulable suspicion. 4 However, before these safe-
guards become applicable a court must determine if there is state action
that in fact results in a seizure.5 In Brower v. County of Inyo,6 the
Supreme Court shed some light on the question of when state conduct
amounts to a seizure.
The plaintiff in Brower, the decedent's mother, alleged that, in order
to stop the decedent who was fleeing police pursuit, the police had
erected a roadblock, which created a substantial risk of significant injury
or death.7 The trial court dismissed the complainant's wrongful death
action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for failure to state a cause of
action. The Supreme Court held that these allegations set forth a claim
sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss.8 In so doing, the Court
Copyright 1989, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
I. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S. Ct. 564, 572 (1928) (Brandeis,
J. dissenting).
2. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826 (1966).
3. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983).
4. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).
5. Cf. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 41 S. Ct. 574 (1921) (fourth amendment
protections only apply to governmental action); United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 843
(7th Cir. 1988) (private party action does not implicate the fourth amendment unless it
is induced by some governmental action); Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado,
466 U.S. 210, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984) (not all citizen/police encounters where the citizen
is delayed are seizures).
6. 109 S. Ct. 1378 (1989).
7. 109 S. Ct. at 1380, 1382.
8. 109 S. Ct. at 1383.
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concluded that the police's lack of desire to have the decedent run into
the road block was irrelevant, finding that for the purposes of the fourth
amendment only an intentional termination of movement is necessary. It
then went on to define intentional termination of movement as one
where a person is "stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion
or put in place" to achieve a stop even if the stop is not effectuated
in the intended manner. 9 Rejecting the claims that the decedent's refusal
to end the chase negated fourth amendment protections, the Court held
that the stop by the roadblock in this case was a seizure and remanded
for a determination of reasonableness.10
2. Reasonableness of Seizure
Once it is determined that a seizure has taken place, the focus shifts
to the issue of whether the police have a sufficient factual basis to
justify the seizure and whether they execute the seizure in a reasonable
manner. A significant amount of the recent "reasonableness" debate
has centered on the right of the police to stop a person because he fits
a predetermined "drug courier profile." In United States v. Sokolow,"
the. Supreme Court diminished the legal significance of police reliance
upon such profiles. In Sokolow, the defendant paid a large sum of
money in small bills for airline tickets, used a false name on his tickets,
stayed at his destination only forty-eight hours (the round trip was
twenty hours), came from a drug source city, appeared nervous, and
checked no luggage for his flight. 2 The Court concluded that these facts
were sufficient to justify the police's articulable suspicion and an in-
vestigatory stop. In light of this determination, the fact that the defen-
dant fit and the police relied upon a pre-determined drug courier profile
did not alter the analysis.' 3
Even if the police have a sufficient factual basis to justify a custodial
arrest, the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment prohibits an
arrest in one's home without prior judicial approval.' 4 However, in
United States v. Von Marschner,5 the court held that this protection
9. 109 S. Ct. at 1382.
10. The Court concluded, that for the purposes of determining whether the roadblock
resulted in a seizure, it would not distinguish between a roadblock that was likely to
cause injury (one around a curve) and one that was not (on a long straightway)-both
constitute seizures. However, it also concluded that the nature of the roadblock is relevant
to determining the reasonableness of the seizure. 109 S. Ct. at 1382.
11. 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989).
12. 109 S. Ct. at 1583.
13. 109 S. Ct. at 1586, 1587.
14. Payton v. New York, 455 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980). However if the
arrest is made in a public place, no warrant is needed. United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411, 96 S. Ct. 820 (1976).
15. 849 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1988) (unpublished), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 797 (1989).
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does not apply when the defendant stepped outside his home pursuant
to a non-coercive request by police and was there arrested. In affirming
the district court, the court of appeals did not consider the issues raised
by the fact that the police had to intrude onto the curtilage of the
defendant's home to knock on the door. This issue was not raised at
the trial level and therefore considered abandoned. However, it would
not appear that entry into the curtilage would constitute a violation of
the fourth amendment. The area leading up to the door is an area
which is open to the general public. The fourth amendment is not
generally implicated when, in the exercise of their investigative functions,
police intrude into the same areas and engage in the same conduct as
normally done by the general public. 6
B. Searches of Persons and Things
1. In General
A search occurs when a state actor invades or intrudes upon an
area in which the claimant has a legitimate expectation of privacy. Such
expectations of privacy are expectations that are subjectively held and
objectively reasonable. 7 A legitimate expectation will not be recognized
in an area that is generally open to public inspection. In Florida v.
Riley,'" the police, flying in a helicopter four hundred feet overhead,
intentionally observed marijuana growing inside a partially covered green-
house. This greenhouse was within the curtilage of the defendant's home,
and therefore protected by the fourth amendment's protections of his
home.' 9 A majority of the Court concluded that the police observations
did not invade any of the defendant's legitimate expectations of privacy.
A four member plurality reasoned that since the helicopter was flying
within Federal Aviation Administration authorized air space, the defen-
dant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy. Justice O'Connor
concurred but placed less reliance on the legality of the flight and more
on the fact that the defendant had not shown that such flights were so
infrequent that any expectation of privacy he might have had was
reasonable. 20
A defendant might also lose his legitimate expectations of privacy
by sharing his dominion and control over -an effect or information with
16. Cf. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 105 S. Ct. 2778 (1985) (the fourth
amendment is not implicated where police observed obscene materials from the same
vantage point and in the same manner as would be observed by the general public).
17. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978).
18. 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989).
19. 109 S. Ct. at 696.
20. 109 S. Ct. at 698 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
19891
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
others. 21 In California v. Greenwood,22 the police obtained the coop-
eration of trash collectors in picking up garbage from the defendant's
residence and turning it over to the police for inspection and search.
The bags were considered outside the curtilage at the time they were
collected.23 The Supreme Court affirmed the searches of the bags, con-
cluding that the defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in




Administrative searches are searches conducted in order to advance
an important government objective other than criminal investigation and
are generally subject to less formality than searches aimed at discovery
of evidence for a criminal prosecution.25 Two administrative search cases
from last term that drew substantial headlines dealt with the government's
right to require and conduct mandatory drug testing. In Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Association, 6 the United States Supreme
Court addressed the constitutionality of Federal Railroad Administration
regulations that require the drug testing of railway employees involved
in train accidents even when there was no particularized suspicion that
the employees had consumed drugs. Employing a balancing test, most
21. See Simien, The Interrelationship of the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and
Standing to Object to Unreasonable Searches, 41 Ark. L. Rev. 487, 545-50 (1987).
22. 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988).
23. 108 S. Ct. at 1627, 1628-29.
24. 108 S. Ct. at 1628-29. See also Trahan v. Nebraska, 428 N.W.2d 619 (Neb.
1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 561 (1988) (defendant had no legitimate expectation of
privacy in garbage placed in a container located only four feet from his back door but
in a spot designated for collection and accessible to the public). Trahan is an expansion
of Greenwood on two points. First, the police had to enter the curtilage to get to the
bags. However, it is consistent with other Supreme Court jurisprudence which allows
police to intrude into protected areas to the extent that the general public normally is
allowed to do so. Cf. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 105 S. Ct, 2778 (1985). Second,
the police actually collected the bags (rather than the garbage collectors, who had consent
of the owner). As to the effect of such consent, see Simien, supra note 21, at 545-50.
25. Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S.
523, 87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967). In many instances, administrative searches may be conducted
without a warrant. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985) (upheld
the search of high school student at school where the official had "reasonable grounds
for suspecting that the search [would] turn up evidence that the student [had] violated
or is violating either a law or the rules of the school"); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S.
594, 101 S. Ct. 2534 (1981) (Secretary of Labor may make warrantless search of mines);
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 92 S. Ct. 1593 (1972) (businesses subject to
licensing requirements and heavy governmental regulations may be inspected without a
warrant).
26. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
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notably articulated (in a different context) in Terry v. Ohio," the Court
concluded that the need to detect drug use under these circumstances
is sufficiently important to permit such testing without a warrant and
without particularized suspicion.2"
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,2 9 the Court
faced a similar issue. In Von Raab, customs service regulations required
employees seeking a promotion or transfer to a job directly involved in
drug interdiction or exposure to classified information, or where the
carrying of a firearm is required, to undergo urinalysis screening.3 0 There
were no provisions for a warrant, probable cause, or even particularized
suspicion. The Court affirmed the regulations as they related to jobs
directly involved in drug interdiction or which required the carrying of
a firearm. It concluded that the fourth amendment interests of the
employees were outweighed by the strong societal interests in preventing
those who used drugs from holding these positions."' However, the Court
remanded for further consideration that aspect of the regulation which
allowed the testing of those seeking a promotion or transfer to a position
where classified information is handled.32
In Griffin v. Wisconsin,33 the Supreme Court ruled that a probation
officer may, as one of the conditions of probation and for probation
related reasons, conduct warrantless searches of the home of a proba-
tioner. The Ninth Circuit expanded upon this ruling in United States
v. Richardson." In Richardson, the court held that where the probation
officer consents to the search for probation related reasons, a warrantless,
non-probable cause search of a state probationer's home may be con-
ducted by a police officer.33
27. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).
28. 109 S. Ct. at 1412, 1414.
29. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989). Justices Scalia and Stevens joined the majority in Skinner
but refused to join in this opinion because, unlike Skinner, there was no "demonstrated
frequency of drug and alcohol use by the targeted class of employees, and the demonstrated
connection between such use and grave harm,"
30. 109 S. Ct. at 1388 (1989).
31. 109 S. Ct. at 1393, 1395, 1397.
32. The Court found that the term "classified information" was too broad and might
include jobs where the societal interests in preventing those using drugs from holding the
jobs were too weak to outweigh the fourth amendment protections. Without defining the
term, however, the Court indicated that the regulation might be upheld as it related to
jobs where the employee would have access to "sensitive information." 109 S. Ct. at
1396 (1989).
33. 483 U.S. 868, 107 S. Ct. 3164 (1987).
34. 849 F.2d 439 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 109 S. Ct. 171 (1988).
35. But cf. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 266 (9th Cir. 1975)
(searches under the Federal Probation Act must be conducted "under the immediate and
personal supervision of [] probation officers").
19891
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C. Self Incrimination
In United States v. Vazquez,3 6 the court held that a police officer
did not interrogate the defendants within the meaning of Miranda v.
Arizona37 when he placed them in the same room with the expectation
that their spontaneous utterances might draw incriminating responses.
This ruling does not appear to be consistent with the definition of
interrogation as provided in Rhode Island v. Innis.3 8 According to Innis,
there is interrogation, for the purposes of Miranda, when the police ask
questions or engage in conduct which they know or should know will
illicit an incriminating response. Under the facts of Vazquez, it should
have been fairly apparent to the officer that his action would illicit an
incriminating response (he even expected that it would). However, Vaz-
quez does appear to be consistent with later Supreme Court pronounce-
ments on the subject. For example, in Arizona v. Mauro, 9 the Supreme
Court found that there was no Miranda interrogation when the officer
allowed the defendant's wife to speak to him and recorded, in plain
view, the conversation being held. After Mauro there seems to be less
reliance upon the Innis test and more upon whether the defendant would
have felt coerced under the circumstances.4 0
It is not only the Constitution that limits the ability of the gov-
ernment to contact and interrogate a criminal defendant; so does the
Code of Professional Responsibility. In United States v. Hammad,41 the
court concluded that a police informant who contacted the defendant,
known to be represented by counsel at the time of the contact, was
acting as the alter ego of the prosecutor.4 2 As such, the contact was in
violation of state ethical rules which prohibit contact by an attorney
with one known to be represented. 43 The court concluded that the
evidence obtained as a result of this violation should be excluded from
a criminal defendant's trial.44
36. 857 F.2d 857 (1st Cir. 1988).
37. 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
38. 466 U.S. 291, 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980).
39. 481 U.S. 520, 107 S. Ct. 1931 (1987).
40. Had the sixth amendment right to counsel attached in any of these cases, the
analysis would have been different. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S. Ct. 1232
(1977) (interrogation occurs when the officer intends to illicit an incriminating response).
41. 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988).
42. The court found that the informant was acting as the prosecutor's alter ego
because he was acting with the cooperation and assistance of the prosecutor. The prosecutor
had given the informant a phony grand jury subpoena in order to convince the defendant
that he, the informant, was under investigation and therefore could be trusted. 858 F.2d
at 840.
43. Cf., Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.2 (1986).




A. Grand Jury Proceedings
In United States v. Mechanik,41 the Supreme Court held that where
an alleged violation of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 6(d) 46
was not raised until two weeks into trial, the jury's subsequent guilty
verdict rendered the error harmless. In Bank of Nova Scotia v. United
States,47 the Court extended this rule to cases where the error in grand
jury proceedings is asserted prior to trial. In Bank of Nova Scotia, the
issue was whether an indictment should be dismissed for prosecutorial
misconduct before the grand jury (presenting misinformation and mis-
treating witnesses), but the Court provided that its ruling was to have
general application to other errors (such as those in Mechanik) in grand
jury proceedings.4" The Court relied upon Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure Rule 52(a), which states that an error "which does not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded," and held that the defendant
would have to prove prejudice to such rights. 49 According to the Court,
in order to prove this prejudice, a defendant would have to show that
the violations "substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to
indict" or that there is "grave doubt" that the decision was free from
undue influence. 0
The United States Supreme Court also recently addressed the in-
terrelationship of the power of the government to compel attendance
before and cooperation with the grand jury and the right against self
admission of the evidence in Hammad. Since the rule it announced was a new one, it
concluded that the police and prosecutor acted in good faith and exclusionary rule policies
would not have been served by excluding the evidence. 858 F.2d at 840-42.
If the communication is by the police, alone, then the evidence is not excluded. Cf.
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986) (police need not advise a suspect
that counsel is attempting to see him and may continue to interrogate unless the defendant
makes a request to see a lawyer).
45. 475 U.S. 66, 106 S. Ct. 938 (1986).
46. This rule proscribes which persons may be present during a grand jury proceeding.
The Louisiana counterpart to this Rule is La. Code Crim. P. art. 433.
47. 108 S. Ct. 2369 (1988).
48. 108 S. Ct. at 2374.
49. 108 S. Ct. at 2374. But see Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 106 S. Ct. 617
(1986) (no need to prove prejudice if members of the defendant's race are intentionally
excluded from the grand jury).
50. 108 S. Ct. at 2374. In State v. Revere, 232 La. 184, 94 So. 2d 25 (1957), the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that where La. Code Crim. P. art. 433 was violated the
indictment should be dismissed. The court did not engage in a harmless error inquiry.
The issue remains as to whether this approach will be reexamined in light of the advent
of the more recent acceptance of the propriety of the harmless error analysis.
1989]
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incrimination. The defendant in Doe v. United States," a target of the
grand jury investigation, refused to sign consent directives. These di-
rectives did not disclose any information about the defendant, not even
if he had accounts, but authorized foreign banks to disclose account
information about him if such accounts existed.' 2 The defendant refused
to sign the directive and was held in contempt. The issue before the
Supreme Court was the constitutional validity of this contempt charge.
The Court concluded that although the defendant was compelled, the
defendant was not entitled to fifth amendment protection since the
directives contained no "testimonial communication." '53
B. Pre-Trial Proceedings and Pleas
In United States v. Broce,4 the Supreme Court held that a counseled
guilty plea to indictments alleging participation in multiple conspiracies
foreclosed the later collateral attack, which was based on the contention
that there was only one conspiracy and therefore conviction on more
than one indictment violated double jeopardy protections. The Court
distinguished Menna v. New York," concluding that this case differed
because in Menna no evidence was needed to prove the claim but in
Broce additional evidence would be necessary.' 6 The Court also rejected
the defendants' claims that their pleas should be set aside as not being
knowing and willing waiver of their double jeopardy rights since they
did not consider the possibility of a double jeopardy claim when they
made their pleas. The Court concluded that a knowing and willing
waiver of double jeopardy claims is not necessary. 7
C. Speedy Trial Rights
The Federal Speedy Trial Act provides for the dismissal of the
prosecution if the terms of the act are violated. There was substantial
debate in the courts of appeals over the appropriate standard for de-
51. 108 S. Ct. 2341 (1988).
52. Id. at 2343.
53. Id. at 2346, 2352. Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826
(1966). Only Stevens dissented, comparing the directive to forcing one to reveal the
combination to a wall safe. 108 S. Ct. at 2352.
If a bank were aware that a directive had been compelled, it might refuse to honor it
and presumably there would be no jurisdiction over a foreign bank to order compliance.
One issue that Doe does not address is whether a court can prohibit a defendant from
communicating to the bank that the directive was compelled.
54. 109 S. Ct. 757 (1989).
55. 423 U.S. 61, 96 S. Ct. 241 (1975) (defendant may have a guilty plea set aside
if he pleads to a jeopardy barred offense).
56. 109 S. Ct. at 765-66.
57. Id.
58. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1982).
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termining whether such dismissals should be with or without prejudice. 9
In United States v. Taylor,6° the Supreme Court provided additional
guidance to the lower courts on this issue. It stated that "courts are
not free simply to exercise their equitable powers in fashioning an
appropriate remedy [for a violation of the Federal Speedy Trial Act],
but, in order to proceed under the Act, must consider at least the three
specified factors" in determining whether dismissal should be with or
without prejudice. 6'
Hoping that the defendant would file a motion to compel, which
would have tolled the running of the time periods under the Federal
Speedy Trial Act, the prosecutor in United States v. Hastings,62 inten-
tionally failed to comply with a local discovery rule. However, the
defendant did not file the motion to compel. When the time period
under the Act expired, the trial court considered the conduct of the
prosecutor, in regards to the discovery rule, and dismissed the prosecution
with prejudice. Following the lead of the Supreme Court in Taylor, the
court of appeals in Hastings reversed the district court's dismissal with
prejudice. It concluded that since the discovery violation did not have
the desired effect, it was not causally related to the speedy trial violations
and not relevant to determining whether the dismissal should be with
or without prejudice.
D. Discovery
The defendant in Arizona v. Youngblood63 claimed that his due
process rights were violated when the police failed to preserve evidence
potentially useful to him and failed to use the latest technology for
performing tests on the evidence that had been destroyed before he
could have other tests performed. The defendant claimed that the results
would have been more accurate with the use of this technology. The
Supreme Court held that in such cases a defendant's due process rights
are not violated unless the police acted in bad faith in destroying the
evidence or not using the latest technology. The Court distinguished
Brady v. Maryland64 and its progeny, where the good faith of the
government is not relevant. The Court found a distinction because in
Youngblood the evidence was only potentially exculpatory whereas the
59. See, e.g., United States v. Kramer, 827 F.2d 1174 (8th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Caparella, 716 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Bittle, 699 F.2d 1201 (D.C.
Cir. 1983).
60. 108 S. Ct. 2413 (1988).
61. Id. at 2417.
62. 847 F.2d 920 (1st Cir.) (unpublished), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 308 (1988).
63. 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988).
64. 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963) (government must provide defendant with all
material exculpatory evidence and information within its knowledge and control).
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Brady line of cases only applies to evidence already determined to be
material and exculpatory.
Since the advent of criminal discovery, courts and commentators
have wrestled with the question of the extent to which a defendant may
forfeit his right to present evidence because of a discovery violation. 65
In Taylor v. Illinois,66 the Supreme Court settled this debate. It held
that a trial court may constitutionally refuse to allow an undisclosed
witness' testimony as a sanction for the defendant's failure to identify
a defense witness in response to a pretrial discovery request.
E. Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
In Strickland v. Washington, 67 the Supreme Court held that as a
general rule a defendant may not obtain a reversal of his conviction
on the basis of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless he
proves that he was prejudiced (no reasonably competent attorney would
commit the error(s) and there is a reasonable probability that error(s)
affected the outcome). However, in some circumstances this prejudice
will be presumed. One such circumstance is where an attorney has an
actual conflict which affects his decisions. 68
The court in Mannhalt v. Reed69 found such a conflict to exist
where a key government witness at the trial accused the defense counsel
of criminal conduct related to defendant's offenses. This conflict affected
counsel's performance when he stayed in the case, he could not call
himself as a witness, his cross examination of the witness accusing him
could be impaired by personal concerns, he did not question the de-
fendant about accusations, and he could not effectively discuss a plea
bargain that might have called on defendant to testify against him.7
65. See, e.g., Taliaferro v. Maryland, 461 U.S. 948, 103 S. Ct. 2114 (1983) (White,
J., dissenting from denial of petition for writ of certiorari).
66. 484 U.S. 400, 108 S. Ct. 646 (1988).
67. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
68. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S. Ct. 1708 (1980). This presumption
of prejudice applies in other contexts as well. See Penson v. Ohio, 109 S. Ct. 346 (1988).
In Penson the Court held that when appointed defense counsel violates the rule of Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967) (appointed counsel wishing to withdraw
from representation on the basis that the appeal desired by his client is frivolous must
submit a brief indicating which points arguably support an appeal), the Strickland and
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967), analyses are not appropriate.
See also United States ex rel. Thomas v. O'Leary, 856 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1988) (complete
failure to file brief in opposition to state's appeal to ruling granting defendant's motion
to suppress is an error which is presumptively prejudicial); Missouri v. Presley, 750 S.W.2d
602 (Mo. App. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 514 (1988) (presumed prejudice when
defense counsel failed to challenge for cause a juror that indicated on voir dire that
crimes committed against him and his family would make him partial to the state).
69. 847 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 260 (1988).
70. Id. at 583.
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In Geders v. United States," the Supreme Court held that a de-
fendant could not be precluded from consulting with his lawyer during
an overnight recess in the middle of the defendant's testimony.12 The
Court addressed a similar issue this last term. In Perry v. Leeke,73 the
trial court prohibited the defendant from consulting with his counsel
during a brief recess in the middle of the defendant's testimony. In
deciding to deny the consultation, the trial court concluded that it was
virtually certain that the consultation would relate entirely to the de-
fendant's ongoing testimony.7 4 In light of this finding and the brief
nature of the recess, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's
action did not violate the Geders rule. 75
Until this last term, there was a conflict in the circuits as to whether
funds needed to retain counsel were exempt from the forfeiture provisions
of 21 U.S.C. § 853.76 In United States v. Monsanto,77 the Supreme
Court held that unless funds are otherwise exempt they are subject to
forfeiture under the terms of the statute. 7 The Court also concluded
that the provision does not offend the due process clause or the sixth
amendment if the forfeiture is made after a determination that there is
probable cause to believe that the funds are subject to forfeiture. 79
The Court specifically left open the question of what type of hearing
would be necessary prior to the pre-conviction forfeiture. In determining
that probable cause was a sufficient factual finding to warrant forfeiture,
the Court made an analogy to cases holding that probable cause was
sufficient to allow pre-trial restraint of the person.80 Under those cases,
an ex parte determination is sufficient.8 ' However, in United States v.
Moya-Gomez,12 the court held that pre-trial forfeiture is only permissible
after an adversarial proceeding. The court reasoned that due process
warranted an adversarial hearing because although the forfeiture might
71. 425 U.S. 80, 96 S. Ct. 1330 (1976).
72. Id. at 91, 96 S. Ct. at 1336.
73. Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594 (1989).
74. Id. at 596, 601.
75. Id. at 602. The Court did, however, confirm indications in Strickland, 466 U.S.
668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), that a violation of the Geders rule is presumptively prejudicial.
Id. at 600.
76. Compare Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir.
1988) (en banc) with United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc).
77. 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
78. 109 S. Ct. at 2665 (1989). In addition, the Court held that the post-conviction
provisions for return of assets transferred to third parties also apply to fees paid to
attorneys. Id. at 2664-65.
79. Id. at 2666-67.
80. Id. at 2666.
81. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S. Ct. 854 (1975).
82. 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988).
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only be temporary, the loss of the attorney of choice might be per-
manent.8 3
Another United States Supreme Court decision which affects the
ability of a defendant to hire the counsel of his choice is Wheat v.
United States.8 4 The defendant in Wheat moved to replace his Counsel
or to enroll an additional counsel. The new counsel that sought to be
enrolled was already counsel of record for two other defendants allegedly
involved in the same crime as the defendant. One of the other defendants
had already plead guilty and a plea agreement for the third was pending
before the trial court. All three had agreed to waive their rights to
conflict-free representation. The prosecutor objected, asserting two po-
tential conflicts. He claimed that the client who plead guilty might be
called as a witness against Wheat and that Wheat might be called to
testify against the third client if that client's plea bargain was not
accepted. The trial court agreed with the arguments of the prosecutor
and denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting the
claim that the waivers of conflict-free representation were sufficient. It
reasoned that "[flederal courts have an independent interest in ensuring
that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the
profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe
them." '8 6 There is a presumption in favor of a defendant's counsel of
choice. However, a trial court is afforded broad discretion in deciding
83. Id. at 726.
84. 108 S. Ct. 1692 (1988).
85. 108 S. Ct. at 1694-95.
86. 108 S. Ct. at 1697.
Neither of these concerns would appear to justify the Court's holding. The represen-
tation of more than one individual where there is a potential conflict of interests does
not necessarily result in a violation of ethical requirements. So long as "the lawyer
reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected," a client may waive
the potential conflict. See, e.g., Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 (1986).
As to the appearance of fairness, it would seem that observers would be more disturbed
by a rule that prohibits a criminal defendant from proceeding with counsel of his choice
than one that prevented him from proceeding with this counsel after waiving any potential
conflict of interests.
In addition to these reasons in support of its holding, the Court also cited courts of
appeals opinions, which allow defendants to assert ineffective assistance of counsel claims
after a waiver of conflict free representation. 108 S. Ct. at 1698. Once again, this did
not justify the Court's holding. In cases where the defendant has waived his right to
conflict free representation, the Court could have established a rule that prevented in-
effective assistance of counsel claims that were based on an alleged conflict of interest.
Cf. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975) (allowing a defendant to
waive the right to legal representation but prohibiting ineffective assistance claims if he
did).
If the court's true concern was that the waiver might not be knowingly made, it could
have formulated a rule that would have required an on the record waiver of the potential
conflict.
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whether to accept a waiver of conflict-free representation and its decision
will not be reversed so long as there is a substantial potential for
conflict . 7
F. Right to Trial by Jury
The Supreme Court recently resolved two issues relating to a criminal
defendant's right to trial by jury. The first centered on the scope of
the right and the second on the procedural mechanisms in the jury
selection process. 8
The sixth amendment right to a jury only applies to serious of-
fenses. s9 In Blanton v. City of Las Vegas,9° the Supreme Court established
a bright line rule for determining whether an offense is "serious" 91 for
this purpose. It held that where the potential imprisonment is six months
or less, the offense is presumptively petty. The presumption is overcome
only if the potential sentence along with the other penalties is so severe
, that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense is
serious.92 In Blanton, where the offense had a maximum penalty of six
months imprisonment (minimum two days or forty-eight hours of com-
munity service in distinctive garb) plus a fine of $200-$1000, the pre-
sumption that the offense was petty was not overcome. 93
Based upon statutory interpretation, a unanimous Supreme Court
in Gomez v. United States94 held that Congress did not intend to allow
magistrates, without the consent of the defendant, to conduct jury
selection. 9 The Court went on to reject the government's contention
that the error was harmless. The Court reasoned that the harmless error
analysis is inappropriate when, over the objection of the defendant, a
federal officer exceeds his authority in selecting a criminal jury. 96
Because Batson v. Kentucky97 was decided under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, there is no significant debate but
87. 108 S. Ct. at 1699.
88. Blanton v. City of Las Vegas, 109 S. Ct. 1289 (1989); Gomez v. United States,
109 S. Ct. 2237 (1989).
89. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 90 S. Ct. 1886 (1970).
90. 109 S.Ct. 1289 (1989).
91. 109 S. Ct. at 1293.
92. Id.
93. 109 S. Ct. at 1293-94.
94. 109 S.Ct. 2237 (1989).
95. 109 S. Ct. at 2247, 2248. Gomez's holding is limited to the interpretation of 28
U.S.C.A. §§ 631-639 (West 1968 & Supp. 1989). As a result it does not address the
authority of states to conduct jury selection in the manner condemned in Gomez. Nor
does it preclude Congress from legislatively overruling the Court's decision.
•96. 109 S. Ct. at 2248.
97. 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986) (reducing the burden of proof for a defendant
attempting to prove that members of his race were intentionally excluded from the petit
jury that tried him).
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that its protections are limited to persons who are members of the group
excluded from the jury. However, there is a split in the federal circuits
as to whether a defendant who is not a member of the excluded group
can still prevail in a challenge to the prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges which intentionally results in a significant underreprese'ntation
of a cognizable group from the jury panel that tried the defendant. 98
In Teague v. Lane,99 the Supreme Court could have settled this split.
The Court rejected the Batson claim because the conviction had become
final prior to its opinion in Batson.' °° It then refused to consider the
possibility of a fair cross section claim. The Court concluded that even
if the claim were meritorious it would not be appropriate to retroactively
grant the relief to this, a habeas corpus, petitioner. 01
In Davis v. Warden, Joliet Correctional Institute,02 the black de-
fendant proved that the state's practice of allowing jurors to volunteer
for jury service at the courthouse closest to their residence resulted in
an all white jury venire (which was a different result than if the venire
had been drawn by a county-wide selection process). However, the court
held that this proof was not sufficient to make out a prima facie case
of systematic substantial underrepresentation of blacks on the venire.'03
The court in Davis did conclude that the "district and state" language
of the sixth amendment placed some limitation upon the power of states
to draw lines designating from where jurors were to be drawn. But,
the court also concluded that this language (which is not directly ap-
plicable to the states) allowed legislatures and courts some flexibility.-
Since the line drawn in this case was done by the jury supervisor rather
than the legislature or courts, this flexibility was not allowed. 05 However,
the defendant did not prevail in his claim because although the process
98. Compare Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 1311 (1989) (holding that a defendant has the right to the possibility of a fair cross-
section on the petit jury) with United States v. Rodriquez-Cardenas, 866 F.2d 390 (11th
Cir. 1989) (hispanics cannot assert the exclusion of blacks from the jury panel either
under Batson or under a fair cross-section claim). All of the cases thus far have dealt
with exclusion of members of a race. However, under a fair cross-section analysis, exclusion
of other cognizable groups would also give rise to a claim. Cf. Daniel v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 31, 95 S. Ct. 704 (1975) (women are a cognizable group for sixth amendment
purposes).
99. 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989).
100. See Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 106 S. Ct. 2878 (1986).
101. 109 S. Ct. at 1078. The Court has granted certiorari to review the decision in
Holland v. Illinois, 520 N.E.2d 682 (1987), where it will once again have an opportunity
to address this issue. See 58 U.S.L.W. 3042 (1989).
102. 867 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1989).
103. Id. at 1006, 1014-15. Cf. United States v. Young, 618 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1980)
(in federal prosecution, a jury drawn from division of district is permissible).
104. 867 F.2d at 1007.
105. Id. at 1009.
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was suspect, he did not prove how significant of a disparity in repre-
sentation the process created.10 6
G. Defendant's Confrontation Rights
A per se rule that allows a child witness in an alleged sexual abuse
of juveniles case to testify behind a screen without a finding that the
exposure to the defendant would be traumatic is a violation of the
constitution's confrontation clause.'07 Justice Scalia, writing for the ma-
jority in Coy v. Iowa,'°s noted that "[m]ost of this Court's encounters
with the Confrontation Clause have involved either the admissibility of
[evidence] .. .or restrictions on the scope of cross-examination." How-
ever, he concluded that the right to come face to face with witnesses
is at the core of the provision and within its "irreducible literal
meaning."' 0 9 Since the provision in question in Coy provided a per se
rule, there was no individualized determination that the witness in that
case would have been prevented from reasonably communicating due to
the trauma of having to testify face-to-face with the defendant. In a
case where such an individualized determination were made, the screening
of a witness would probably withstand constitutional challenge.10
H. Double Jeopardy
In Jones v. Thomas,"' the defendant was convicted of two offenses
joined for trial. As the offenses did not each contain an element not
contained in the other and there was no legislative intent to proscribe
two punishments, the conviction and punishment for both offenses con-
stituted double jeopardy."12 While defendant had appeals pending, the
governor commuted his sentence on one offense. After the defendant
completed serving the term of the commuted sentence, an appellate court
ruled that his conviction on the offense with the commuted sentence
should be vacated because the conviction on both offenses violated his
double jeopardy rights. The court then credited the time served on that
conviction to the other offense. The Supreme Court held this remedy
to be sufficient." 3
106. Id. at 1014.
107. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988). The screen obscured the witness's view of
the defendant and the defendant's view of the witness.
108. 108 S.Ct. 2798 (1988).
109. Id. at 2800, 2803.
110. Cf. Id. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
111. 109 S. Ct. 2522 (1989).
112. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 103 S. Ct. 673 (1983).
113. Justice Scalia wrote a critical dissent. He asserted that it has been long settled
that once a sentence has been completed (as was the case for the commuted sentence),
conviction on another offense that is double jeopardy barred is not permissible even if




In Lockhart v. Nelson,1 4 the state presented evidence of the requisite
number of convictions to prove habitual offender status. However, under
state law, one of the convictions that had been pardoned could not be
used to establish this status. As a result, the conviction was reversed.
After the reversal, the state held another trial and submitted the requisite
number of valid convictions. The United States Supreme Court held
that this procedure did not violate double jeopardy protections.",5 The
reasoning of the Court is questionable. The double jeopardy clause
prevents the retrial of a defendant if the prosecution fails to present
sufficient evidence to meet its burden of proof." 6 In Lockhart, not only
was the evidence of the pardoned conviction inadmissible (as the Court
referred to it), the evidence submitted at the first trial was insufficient
(not enough qualifying convictions were proved to establish habitual
offender status)."7
I. Death Penalty
The court of appeals in Giarratano v. Murray"' had held that
providing libraries to inmates on death row is not a sufficient protection
of their right to adequate review on their habeas corpus claims. It ruled
that the system must be supplemented with appointment of counsel
through the state habeas corpus proceeding level but not through the
federal level. The Supreme Court reversed." 9 Four members of the Court
concluded that Pennsylvania v. Finley,20 which held that appointment
of counsel for collateral attacks is not required under the Constitution,
applies to collateral proceedings following a capital conviction and death
sentence. Two justices concurred, relying on the facts that the state law
provided for appointment of counsel once a petition, which showed
promise of merit, was filed and that no inmate had thus far been unable
to obtain counsel to represent him in the death penalty post-conviction
proceeding before state courts.'
2
'
114. 109 S. Ct. 285 (1988).
115. Id. at 288-89.
116. Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 101 S. Ct. 970 (1981).
117. Lockhart is less questionable if it will be strictly limited to its facts. Proof of
habitual offender status is different from proof of substantive offenses. This status is a
condition that is subject to fluctuation. A defendant's status changes as he is convicted
of additional offenses. As a result, courts will often be faced with a situation where the
same underlying facts (e.g., the same previous convictions) might be insufficient to prove
the status. However, when this evidence is joined with other, later developed facts there
would be sufficient evidence. For that reason, the same evidence might be admissible in
more than one proceeding aimed at proving habitual offender status.
118. 847 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
119. Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989).
120. 481 U.S. 551, 107 S. Ct. 1990 (1987).
121. 109 S. Ct. at 2772-73.
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Other issue settled by the Court in the last two terms is the extent
to which the death penalty may be imposed on minors and mentally
retarded persons. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 22 four members of the
Court concluded that the death penalty may not be constitutionally
imposed on a person who was less than sixteen years old at the time
of the commission of the offense. Justice O'Connor concurred. 2 1 She
found that for the statute under review there had not been a specific
legislative decision to impose the death penalty on persons below sixteen
years of age at the time of the offense.'24 Without a specific legislative
determination, Justice O'Connor would require a showing that there is
a national consensus to allow the death penalty to be imposed on this
group. She found no such national consensus.'25 In two other cases
involving minors and the death penalty, the Court held that it is con-
stitutional to impose the death penalty on persons who were ages sixteen
and seventeen at the time of the commission of the offense. 26
122. 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988).
123. Id. at 2706-11 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
124. However, she did not reach the issue of the constitutionality of a statute that
specifically provided that the death penalty might be imposed on those persons.
125. 108 S. Ct. at 2706 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
126. Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989) and Wilkins v. Missouri, 109 S.
Ct. 2969 (1989). Nor is it unconstitutional to impose the death penalty on a mentally
retarded adult with the reasoning capacity of a seven-year old. Penry v. Lynaugh, 109
S. Ct. 2934 (1989). However, the death penalty was reversed in Penry. The Court found
that the jury instructions prevented the jury from considering the defendant's insanity as
a mitigating factor.
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